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I. INTRODUCTION
As a new commissioner at the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC" or "the Commission"), I have developed five key principles that
inform my regulatory philosophy and that will serve as guideposts during
my tenure at the FCC. This Article defines and gives context to those
principles.
First, Congress sets the FCC's responsibilities in the Communications
Act, and the Commission should faithfully implement those tasks rather
than pursuing an independent agenda. Second, fully functioning markets
deliver better products and services to consumers as compared to markets
regulated by the government. Unless structural factors prevent markets
from being competitive, or Congress has established objectives (such as
universal service) that are not market-based, government should be
reluctant to intervene in the marketplace. Third, where the FCC
promulgates rules, it should ensure that those rules are clear and vigorously
enforced. Efficient markets depend on clear and predictable rules, and a
failure to enforce rules undermines the agency's credibility and
effectiveness. Fourth, a regulatory agency-particularly one with
jurisdiction over a high-tech sector like communications--cannot possibly
duplicate the resources and expertise of those it regulates. Therefore, the
FCC must be humble about its own abilities and must reach out to
consumer groups, industry, trade associations, and state regulators to
maximize the information available in the decision-making process.
Finally, as a government agency supported by taxpayers, the FCC should
strive to provide the same degree of responsiveness and effectiveness that
would be expected of an organization in the private sector.
These principles are the product of my experiences in government and
the private sector. I have previously served at the FCC as a legal advisor
under two respected and dedicated commissioners, and I have worked for
an array of businesses representing a broad spectrum of the
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communications industry, including providers of satellite, wireless, and
wireline communications services. I have also served in a variety of
leadership capacities for the Federal Communications Bar Association,
including a term as its president.
While I am fortunate to have learned a lot from these diverse
experiences, no set of experiences can fully prepare a commissioner to
address all of the complex technical and legal issues the Commission faces
on a daily basis. But I am confident that, by relying on the principles
discussed in this Article, I will help the Commission deliver to consumers
the benefits envisioned by Congress in enacting the Communications Act.
While we have many hard problems to address, I look forward to working
with my fellow commissioners, the talented and hard-working agency staff,
state regulators, consumers, trade associations, businesses, and the Bar to
meet these challenges.
II. GUIDING PRINCIPLES
A. The FCC Should Focus on Implementing the Agenda Set by
Congress in the Statute
The FCC is an independent agency created by Congress, and as such,
its priorities are defined not by the predilections of the commissioners but
by the text of the Communications Act. Like any institution, the FCC has a
finite amount of resources. We should expend those resources
implementing congressional priorities, and only after those are fulfilled
should we pursue objectives that lie within our discretionary authority.
Statutory language at its best provides a clear guide for the
Commission's priorities. Landmark legislation like the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("the 1996 Act" or "the Act") serves as
an excellent example. In many of the Act's provisions, Congress set forth
explicit timetables for the FCC's execution of statutory mandates,
including a six-month deadline for implementing the market-opening duties
in section 2511 and a two-year deadline for overhauling the universal
service subsidy scheme in section 254.2 In these sections, Congress decreed
that the FCC "shall" implement specific provisions of the Act.3 Other
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 47 U.S.C. §
251(d)(1) (Supp. V 1999).
2. Id. § 254(a)(1)-(2).
3. See id. § 251(d)(1) ("[w]ithin 6 months after... [the date of enactment of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996], the Commission shall complete all actions necessary to
establish regulations to implement the requirements of this section."); id. § 254(a)(1) ("the
Commission shall institute and refer to a Federal-State Joint Board... a proceeding to
recommend changes to any of its regulations in order to implement sections 214(e) ... and
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provisions, by contrast, state that the FCC "may" take certain actions. 4 I
believe the FCC should concentrate on fulfilling specific mandates (the
"shalls"), even where Congress did not impose a specific timetable for
doing so, before it devotes resources to proceedings that are purely
discretionary (the "mays"). And the agency should certainly address
specific statutory responsibilities ("shalls" and "mays") before launching
any public policy initiatives in areas where the statute is silent.
I acknowledge that the statutory scheme dictates the FCC's priorities
only to a point. That is, although the statute creates tiers of responsibilities
(the "shalls," "mays," and silence), it does not often indicate which "shall"
should be tackled first or with the most resources. It is in this prioritization
that the Commission is required to exercise its judgment as an expert
independent agency. The President has appointed each of us as
commissioners-assisted by the expert staff at the Commission-to make
these judgments. I am concerned that, at times, prior commissions may
have viewed this discretion to prioritize among congressional mandates as
a license to modify the mandates themselves.
Indeed, the FCC has damaged its credibility and prestige on occasion
by focusing on discretionary acts to the detriment of implementing
statutory mandates. For example, at a time when the Commission was
overwhelmed with mandatory proceedings arising from the 1996 Act, the
FCC spent a considerable amount of time exploring a proposal to compel
broadcast networks to provide free advertising time to political candidates.5
Devoting resources to the pursuit of such a proposal should occur only to
the extent that it does not burden or interfere with the fulfillment of
Congress's express statutory directions.
Such freelancing is particularly questionable in light of the FCC's
failure in recent years to fulfill all of its statutory obligations. For example,
in 1992, Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
this section"); id. § 254(a)(2) ("[t]he Commission shall initiate a single proceeding to
implement the recommendations from the Joint Board... and shall complete such
proceeding within 15 months . .
4. See, e.g., id. § 273(c)(3):
The Commission may prescribe such additional regulations under this section as
may be necessary to ensure that manufacturers have access to the information with
respect to the protocols and technical requirements for connection with and use of
telephone exchange service facilities that a Bell operating company makes
available to any manufacturing affiliate or any unaffiliated manufacturer.
See also id. § 316(a)(1) ("[alny station license or construction permit may be modified by
the Commission... if in the judgment of the Commission such action will promote the
public interest, convenience, and necessity ....").
5. See, e.g., Brooks Boliek, FCC Divided But Is Prepared for Airtime Debate,
HOLLYWOOD REP., Jan. 29, 1998, at 1.
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(TCPA), which prohibited, among other things, unsolicited faxes.' One
does not need to be an FCC Commissioner to recognize that, for over a
decade, American consumers have fought a losing battle with fax
advertisers. Despite the obvious pervasiveness of the problem, it took the
Commission no less than seven years to bring its first enforcement action.7
Unsolicited faxes certainly do not grab headlines in the way free political
advertising does, but that is not the standard by which we should assess the
FCC's job performance. Therefore, I believe that the Commission should
devote additional resources to enforce our rules prohibiting unsolicited
faxes. I have been heartened by the Commission's increased enforcement
efforts in this area over the past few years.8 In addition, the FCC should
step up its efforts to inform consumers of their rights under the TCPA.
Only with these efforts will the Commission fulfill the statutory mandate
and the prioritization inherent in the TCPA.
I consider proposals like the push for free political ads ill-conceived
not only because they divert Commission resources away from statutory
priorities, but also because the FCC should be wary of adopting significant
new regulations in areas where Congress has not spoken. The statute gives
the FCC broad general rulemaking authority on matters that are
"necessary" to the execution of its functions (e.g., section 4(i)), but this is a
weak reed on which to base a major policy initiative.9 Similarly, in the
recent debate over whether to mandate "open access" to the network
infrastructure of cable operators providing high-speed Internet access, some
proponents of such access argued that the FCC has the requisite statutory
authority under section 4(i), 0 even if the FCC lacks authority to impose
such a requirement under Title II or Title VI of the TCPA. I believe that the
FCC rarely, if ever, should reach out to assert authority in this manner; nor
are the courts likely to bless such efforts. The FCC should exercise
restraint-we should not grant ourselves the authority that a fair reading of
the TCPA denies us.
6. Pub. L. No. 102-556, § 402, 106 Stat. 4194 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §
227(b)(1)(C) (1994)).
7. See generally Get-Aways, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 15
F.C.C.R. 1805, 18 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1282 (1999) [hereinafter Get-Aways, Inc.].
8. See US Notary, Inc., File No. EB-00-TC-011, Notice of Apparent Liability, 15
F.C.C.R. 16999, 21 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 951 (2000); Tri-Star Marketing, Inc., File No. EB-
00-TC-009, Notice of Apparent Liability, 15 F.C.C.R. 11295, 21 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 37
(2000); Get-Aways, Inc., supra note 7.
9. See, e.g., FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 709 (1979) (stating that
authority to impose broad new obligations on cable operators, beyond those that are
reasonably ancillary to core jurisdiction, "must come specifically from Congress.").
10. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (1994).
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B. Fully Functioning Markets Invariably Make Better Decisions
than Do Regulators
My second core principle derives from my faith in the ability of
market forces to maximize consumer welfare. Despite the noblest of
intentions, government simply cannot allocate resources, punish sloth, or
spur innovation as efficiently as markets. The history of our nation, and the
demise of those that have adopted centrally planned economies, makes this
proposition indisputable. While there is a critical role for regulation-as I
discuss below, ensuring that markets are open to competition, limiting
licensees' ability to impose costs on others, and achieving specific
congressional objectives-we should rely on market forces in lieu of
regulatory mandates wherever we can do so consistent with Congress's
explicit instructions.
1. Placing Trust in Market Forces
Regulators should have a healthy skepticism towards any attempt to
displace market forces with regulation. Therefore, in each case, I will ask:
Is this regulation truly necessary? Is there a market failure? Will the
burdens imposed -by the proposed regulation outweigh its anticipated
benefits? Will it preserve incentives for companies to innovate, and thereby
deliver better services and lower prices to consumers? Would a less
regulatory approach, paired with an emphasis on strict enforcement of
existing rules, produce greater consumer welfare? Similarly, I will
continually examine our existing regulations to ensure that the original
justification for regulatory intervention remains valid.
My experience in both the private and public sectors leads me to
believe that, more often than not, the answers to these questions will
indicate that prescriptive regulatory intervention in the marketplace is not
warranted. Even if a proposed regulation appears to have sound
justifications, we must keep in mind that all regulations produce
unanticipated consequences. And in many cases, those consequences are
sufficiently negative as to outweigh the benefits that regulators originally
envisioned. I believe that consumers are usually better served if regulators
shift their emphasis from imposing prescriptive rules-which by their very
nature are inflexible and overbroad, and therefore tend to hamper
innovation-to relying on a regime with fewer rules and a greater emphasis
on enforcement mechanisms. Enforcement mechanisms have the advantage
of being narrowly tailored to specific anticompetitive practices, thus
leaving companies free to engage in other procompetitive conduct that may
have been barred by a prescriptive rule.
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Several examples inform my skepticism about relying on regulatory
mandates as a means of promoting consumer welfare. Historically, where
the FCC has eschewed a heavy regulatory hand in favor of market forces,
the results generally have been beneficial for consumers. The explosive
growth of the wireless sector provides perhaps the best example. When
Congress passed section 332 in 1993, the Commission faced a key choice
of how to regulate Personal Communications Services ("PCS") and other
new wireless services." As some argued, the FCC could have imposed
strict Title II common carrier regulatory constraints on pricing and service
terms and conditions, based on the supposed entrenchment of incumbent
cellular providers. Instead, it forewent traditional regulatory constraints on
pricing and service offerings. 2 The consequence has been that consumers
now enjoy unparalleled choice, dramatically lowered prices, and improved
calling plans and service quality. 13 Similarly, the Commission's approach to
Part 15 unlicensed services is instructive.14 By designating certain spectrum
bands for unlicensed use, the Commission has effectively created a hotbed
of wireless innovation, freed from the transaction costs and confines of
spectrum licensing.' 5 The FCC likewise has exercised restraint in its
approach to most Internet access services. By refraining from imposing
complex and burdensome regulations on providers of dial-up Internet
access and cable modems, the Commission has allowed these services to
flourish.'6
11. 47 U.S.C. § 332 (1994).
12. See generally Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions
with Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, Second Report, FCC 97-75, at 3 (rel. Mar. 25,
1997), available at http://www.fcc.gov/wtb/reports/documents/cmrscomp.pdf.
13. Sixth Annual CMRS Competition Report, Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive
Market Conditions with Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, Sixth Report, 16 F.C.C.R.
13350, 34 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 170 (2001).
14. See 47 C.F.R. § 15 (Dec. 18,2001).
15. See, e.g., Amendment of Part II of the Comm'n's Rules to Allocate Spectrum
Below 3GHz for Mobile and Fixed Servs. to Support the Introduction of New Advanced
Wireless Servs., Including Third Generation Wireless Sys., Memorandum Opinion and
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaldng, ET Docket No. 00-258, para. 9-13 (rel.
Aug. 20, 2001). Unfortunately, the "unlicensed" PCS licenses have never enjoyed this
success based on a number of factors, including premiums associated with relocation of
incumbents from the band, distinct spectrum etiquette for each of the 10 MHz sub-bands,
the temporary ban on nomadic devices, the narrow bandwidth available, and the lack of
internationally harmonized rules. None of these factors were present for Part 15 devices at
2.4 GHz.
16. By contrast, the Commission's heavy regulation of DSL-based Internet access
services arguably has hampered deployment of those services.
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The flip side of these success stories is the drag on competition and
innovation that sometimes has resulted from the FCC's over-regulation of
other services. I believe that has been the case with respect to some of the
FCC's efforts to jump-start local telephone competition. This is
undoubtedly a complicated issue. Local telephony is an arena in which
incumbents previously held state-sanctioned monopolies, and Congress has
charged the FCC with introducing competition where many economists
have asserted it could not flourish. But I believe that, in its zeal to facilitate
competition by new entrants against incumbent local telephone companies,
the FCC has erected an overly complex regulatory regime that has
impeded, rather than facilitated, competition.
The Supreme Court's review of the FCC's first local competition
order is telling. In vacating the FCC's initial interpretation of the 1996
Act's unbundling provision, the Court chastised the Commission for
adopting a standardless approach that led to the forced sharing of virtually
every network facility. 7 To be sure, some degree of forced sharing is
plainly necessary, both under the test of section 251 and as a matter of
public policy. Without forced sharing, competitive local exchange carriers
("LECs") simply could not enter the market, given the rational business
incentives of incumbent LECs to resist competitive entry. Indeed, the
experience of the last five years-countless incidents of foot-dragging,
protracted litigation, and the like-confirms that the incumbent LECs have
been anything but eager to see their local markets opened to robust
competition. But as Justice Breyer's separate opinion in Iowa Utilities
Board cogently noted, there is a risk of relying too heavily on forced
sharing as a means of facilitating competition.18 Excessive sharing of
facilities destroys the investment incentives of both incumbents and new
entrants alike: rational incumbents avoid risking capital on new facilities if
rivals can get a free ride, and rational entrants will refrain from deploying
their own facilities if they have unrestricted access to incumbents'
networks at cost-based rates.' 9 This stiffing of investment incentives is all
the more problematic where supposedly "cost-based" rates are, as in some
cases, based on a model that makes unrealistic economic assumptions and
accordingly turn out to be below actual cost. In striving to stimulate some
form of local telephone competition, by creating expansive resale and
unbundling opportunities, we have adopted rules that have failed to
engender, and may have actually hampered, facilities-based competition-
which is the most viable strategy in the long term and the one most likely to
17. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 386-92 (1999).





I believe that the FCC should have resisted competitors' demands to
unbundle each and every piece of the incumbents' networks. At the very
least, the FCC should have considered attaching sunset provisions to some
of its more expansive unbundling rules in an effort to prompt a transition to
facilities-based competition. Instead, the FCC initially construed the
impairment standard-which Congress intended as a constraint on
unbundling-as covering any circumstance where a new entrant's lack of
access to the network element in question caused any increase in cost or
decrease in quality to the competitor's service.20 In the long term, however,
incumbents and new entrants alike-and, most importantly, consumers-
will be better off in a market that is less dependent on shared network
facilities. We can best promote competition by imposing an "impairment"
threshold that recognizes the costs of forced sharing in addition to the
benefits. By limiting the availability of unbundling to the smaller set of
circumstances where the lack of access to network facilities causes a
material degree of impairment, the agency could have done more-and
will do more going forward-to spur the deployment of facilities by
competitors and, in turn, the development of more robust and resilient
•• 21
competition.
The FCC's regulation of the Local Multipoint Distribution Service
("LMDS") provides another cautionary tale. When the FCC licensed
LMDS providers, it categorically barred incumbent local telephone
companies and cable operators from obtaining licenses within their
operating regions, notwithstanding that these providers might have used
LMDS spectrum to provide consumers with a host of innovative new
22
services. Because these major players were kept out of the game,
equipment manufacturers may have been less inclined to devote substantial
20. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, para. 285, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
82(1996).
21. See Iowa Utils. Bd, 525 U.S. at 389-90.
[The Commission's assumption that any increase in cost (or decrease in quality)
imposed by denial of a network element renders access to that element
"necessary," and causes the failure to provide that element to "impair" the
entrant's ability to furnish its desired services, is simply not in accord with the
ordinary and fair meaning of those terms.
Id. (emphasis in original). See also id. at 430 (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (criticizing
FCC decision to force an incumbent "to share virtually every aspect of its business" and
noting that excessive unbundling frustrates competition).
22. See Rulemaking to Amend Parts 1, 2, 21, and 25 of the Commission's Rules,
Second Report and Order, Order on Reconsideration, and Fifth Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 12 F.C.C.R. 12545, para. 13, 6 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1291 (1997) [hereinafter
Order on Reconsideration].
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resources toward the development of LMDS devices, and the service has
never really gotten off the ground. The FCC ultimately recognized the
problem and agreed to lift the ownership restriction,23 but it may have done
so too late. Thus, out of a fear that incumbents would harm competition,
the FCC issued prophylactic regulations that may have precluded any
competition.
In sum, prescriptive regulation is sometimes necessary, but there is a
significant risk of construing the Act's provisions too broadly-i.e., so
broadly as to undercut the marketplace. The lesson we take from these
examples should be a commitment to rely on market forces unless there is a
clear and convincing case for ex ante regulatory intervention-as opposed
to mere speculation about potential anticompetitive effects. I describe
below three categories of instances where this presumption against
intervention is likely to be overcome.
2. Where Does Regulation Remain Necessary?
While reluctant to intervene in the marketplace, I recognize that there
are certain critical functions that regulators must perform, even in a
competitive marketplace, in furtherance of the public interest. These
functions largely fall into three overarching categories of regulations: those
that (a) ensure that markets are free of structural barriers to competition; (b)
prevent licensees from imposing costs on consumers and competitors, and
address other market failures; and (c) implement specific congressional
policy choices that are not market-driven and may be unrelated to the
advancement of competition. In assessing the continued efficacy of our
rules that perform these functions, the FCC is greatly assisted by
Congress's creation of a biennial review process and forbearance authority,
which require us regularly to reexamine our rules to ensure that they
remain necessary in the face of increasing competition.
a. Regulations Aimed at Eliminating Structural Barriers to
Competition
Since a regulatory model that relies predominantly on market forces
presupposes the existence of competition, we must resort to regulatory
intervention if structural barriers impede competition from developing in
the first instance. For example, achieving competition in local wireline
telephony requires governmental intervention because the incumbent
LECs' control of essential network facilities, and their business incentives
23. See Rulemaking to Amend Parts 1, 2, 21 and 25 of the Commission's Rules, Third
Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 11857, paras. 1, 15,
24, 15 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (2000).
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to resist making those facilities available to competitors, would preclude
competition from other wireline carriers absent such intervention. Congress
accordingly enacted section 251(c)(3) of the Communications Act, which
directs the FCC to ensure unbundled access to incumbent LECs' network
facilities where an absence of such access would "impair" a competitor's
ability to provide service.24 In the same vein, section 251(c)(6) grants
competitors the right to "co-locate" equipment in incumbents' central
offices to the extent necessary for interconnection or access to unbundled
network elements.25 Similarly, Congress has mandated the provision of
nondiscriminatory access to utilities' telephone poles, ducts, conduits, and
rights-of-way, recognizing that market forces are unlikely to induce a
monopoly owner of such rights-of-way to provide access on
26nondiscriminatory terms and conditions. The key to our implementation
of these mandates is to preserve the balance struck by Congress between
opening formerly closed markets, on the one hand, and maintaining
incentives for carriers to invest in facilities, on the other. I believe we can
best accomplish this goal by adhering closely to the precise language in the
statute-and refraining from broadening (or constricting) rights based on
our own policy preferences.
b. Regulations that Limit Negative Externalities and Address
Other Market Failures
A similar need for intervention arises where, notwithstanding the
existence of competition, competitors can externalize costs on other actors
or where other market failures occur. A textbook example of a negative
externality is spectrum interference. Where one service provider's use of
spectrum-say, to provide a wireless communications service or a
broadcast service-causes interference to another licensee's spectrum
band, the FCC must intervene to ensure that each licensee remains able to
enjoy the full bundle of rights granted by an FCC license.
In other instances, the justification for intervention is not a negative
externality, but the occasional service that in Congress's judgment does not
24. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3), (d)(2) (Supp. V 1999). As discussed above, the statutory
language leaves open the question of how broadly the sharing requirements should be
construed-i.e., how the statutory term "impair" should be defined. I am guided in this
respect by my preference for market forces over prescriptive regulation. Thus, while the
FCC is statutorily obligated to mandate sharing to the extent required to facilitate
competition, I believe it should be circumspect and avoid imposing unnecessary obligations,
because excessive sharing destroys the investment incentives of incumbents and new
entrants alike. See Iowa Utils. Bd, 525 U.S. at 430 (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
25. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6).
26. Id. § 224(f)(1).
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lend itself to a market-based solution. For example, Congress has mandated
that manufacturers of telecommunications equipment and service providers
ensure that their equipment and services be "accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities, if readily achievable. 2 1 Thus, while one could
posit that market forces generally should determine the availability of such
equipment and services to individuals with disabilities, Congress has
determined that access for individuals with disabilities is too important to
defer to the market. Where these situations do arise and require
intervention in the marketplace, we should adopt clearly focused and
narrowly tailored rules.
c. Regulations Implementing Congressional Policies Unrelated to
Competition
Of course, not everything the FCC does (or should do) relates to
greasing the wheels of competition. The 1996 Act sets forth various policy
goals that are independent of-or even in tension with-the development
of competition. One such goal entails the preservation and advancement of
universal service support for consumers living in high-cost areas, for
schools and libraries (the "e-rate" program), and for underserved areas such
as Indian tribal lands." Congress has called on the FCC to implement many
other policies distinct from advancing competition: it enacted the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, or CALEA, to
ensure that carriers cooperate with law enforcement investigations; 29 it
acted to preserve video programming diversity by imposing public interest
obligations on broadcasters and "must carry" requirements on cable and
satellite operators, among other requirements; 0 and it enacted provisions to
protect consumers from unauthorized changes in their long-distance service
("slamming").3' Regardless of the role of market forces, the Commission
has an obligation to carry out its statutory responsibilities.
3. Eliminating Unnecessary Regulations Through the Biennial
Review Process
Equally important to viewing proposed new regulations with
skepticism is an ongoing commitment to review existing regulations for
27. Id. § 255(b)-(c).
28. See id § 254.
29. Id. §§ 1001-1010 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
30. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 309(k) (Supp. V 1999) (broadcast licensing standards), § 338
(Supp. V 1999) (satellite "must carry" requirements), § 534 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (cable
"must carry" requirements).
31. Id. § 258.
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obsolescence. There is a tendency for regulators to expand and defend their
turf, even after the narrow justification for regulatory intervention in the
marketplace has long since disappeared. Because of this tendency, I believe
it is important for the FCC to re-examine continually all of our regulations
with an eye toward eliminating those that no longer serve the public
interest.
Congress recognized that inertia and the press of new business make
such review efforts unlikely when agencies are left to their own devices.
Congress therefore mandated, in section 11 of the 1996 Act, a
comprehensive biennial review of all FCC rules that apply to
32telecommunications service providers. If the FCC determines that a
regulation no longer is necessary in light of competitive developments, it is
required to eliminate or modify the regulation.33 With a few exceptions,
Congress also directed the FCC, in section 10 of the 1996 Act, to forbear
from enforcing any regulation or provision of the Act where: (a) such
enforcement is not necessary to prevent unjust charges or practices or
discrimination; (b) such enforcement is not necessary to protect consumers;
and (c) forbearance is consistent with the public interest.3
Forbearance and the biennial review process are critical components
of Congress's vision of a procompetitive, deregulatory telecommunications
marketplace. My hope is that we use these vehicles to eliminate many of
the complex and outmoded regulations that constitute much of the five
thick volumes of Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
The fruits of the initial biennial reviews and forbearance actions have
been modest, but offer some basis for optimism. One significant cut arising
from the 2000 Biennial Review was the elimination of significant portions
of Part 68 of the FCC's rules, which governed the connection of customer
premises equipment to the telephone network.35 The FCC wisely
recognized that the detailed regulations establishing technical criteria and
requiring registration with the agency were unnecessary in light of the
ability of private standards organizations to perform these functions.36
Another important recent streamlining effort entailed an overhaul of myriad
application procedures for wireless and broadcast services. The FCC
established an electronic universal licensing system and searchable
32. Id. § 161(a)(1).
33. Id. § 161(a)(2)-(b).
34. See id § 160(a).
35. 2000 Biennial Reg. Review; Part 68 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regs., Report and
Order, FCC 00-400 (rel. Dec. 21, 2000).
36. See 2000 Biennial Reg. Review of Part 68 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regs.,
Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 24944, para. 4,22 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1117 (2000).
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database that dramatically improved the speed, efficiency, and reliability of
the application-filing process for wireless telecommunications services,"
and it similarly streamlined mass media application processes. 8 The FCC's
detariffing of international long-distance services provides another
promising example of one potential role for biennial review. The
Commission held that, as a result of competition, the tariff-filing
requirements that were designed for the old-world-style "dominant
carriers" are no longer necessary to ensure just and reasonable rates.39
Looking ahead, I anticipate that there may be other regulations that
will not warrant preservation in their current form under the "necessity"
standards in sections 10 and 11 of the 1996 Act. One candidate consists of
the myriad cost accounting and reporting requirements that apply to local
exchange carriers; the FCC has recently streamlined these rules, and is
continuing its review to determine whether additional changes areS 40
appropriate. Another area due for review is the newspaper/broadcast
cross-ownership rule.4' Although such rules have been in place a long time,
it is not clear to me that, in their current form, they continue to serve the
goals they were adopted to promote. In the case of accounting and
reporting requirements, these goals include the prevention of cross-
subsidies and other anticompetitive conduct; in the case of the broadcast
ownership restriction, they are the preservation of competition, localism,
and diversity. These goals undoubtedly remain important, but I believe we
are overdue in re-examining whether the complex and burdensome
regulatory regimes adopted in the last century continue to serve those goals
in the twenty-first century.
37. See Biennial Reg. Review; Amendment of Parts 0, 1, 13, 22, 24, 26, 27, 80, 87, 90,
95, 97, and 101 of the Comm'n's Rules, Report and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 21027, para. 4, 13
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1207 (1998).
38. See 1998 Biennial Reg. Review; Streamlining of Mass Media Applications, Rules,
and Processes, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 17525, para. 1, 17 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 970 (1999).
39. See 2000 Biennial Reg. Review; Policy and Rules Concerning the Int'l
Interexchange Marketplace, Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 10647, para. 28, 23 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 607 (2001).
40. These requirements are found in numerous sections of the FCC's rules, including
Parts 32, 36, 43, 64, 65, and 69 of Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The FCC's
most recent streamlining effort was part of the 2000 Biennial Review proceeding. See 2000
Biennial Reg. Review; Comprehensive Review of the Accounting Requirements and
ARMIS Reporting Requirements for Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers Phase 2, and
Amendments to the Uniform System of Accounts for Interconnection, FCC 01-305 (Nov. 5,
2001), available at http://www.fcc.gov.
41. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (2000). The Commission launched a proceeding seeking
comment on this rule on September 13, 2001. See Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations
and Newspapers; Newspaper/Radio Cross-Ownership Waiver Policy, FCC 01-262 (Sept. 20,
2001), available at http://www.fcc.gov.
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C. We Should Ensure that Our Regulations Are Clear and
Vigorously Enforced
1. The FCC's Rules Must Be Clear
Despite our general efforts to deregulate portions of the
communications industry, the FCC will continue to adopt a significant
number of new rules in the foreseeable future. My goal is for these rules to
be as streamlined and clear as possible to advance the public interest.
I was often frustrated in private practice when I encountered
needlessly complex rules that were difficult even for experts to decipher.
The FCC's implementation of the key provisions in the 1996 Act is a prime
example of good intentions-an apparent desire to address every
imaginable issue and subissue-gone awry. The FCC's first order
implementing only some of the local competition provisions in section 251
was 752 pages long.42 The initial universal service order also was a
behemoth-and there have been dozens of subsequent orders released in
that docket.43 What's more, those remarkably detailed orders tell only part
of the story: the FCC devised a forward-looking cost model (along the lines
of the TELRIC model used to price network elements) to determine
universal service subsidies that has so many inputs and lines of code that
some carriers have reported it taking about eight days just to run the
44
computer program.
While an order's length and complexity is not necessarily a vice, I
believe that the effort to micromanage every aspect of the pathway to
competition was misguided. The FCC's rules should address our core
priorities-in this context, ensuring that incumbent telephone companies
comply with the market-opening duties set forth in the 1996 Act-as
concisely as possible. Our rules should not address every conceivable
42. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1996).
43. See Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 8776, 7
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 109 (1997). The FCC recently released its fourteenth substantive
report and order and twenty-second order on reconsideration. See Fed.-State Joint Bd. on
Universal Serv., Fourteenth Report and Order, Twenty-Second Order on Reconsideration,
and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 96-45, and Report and
Order in CC Docket No. 00-256, 16 F.C.C.R. 11244 (2001).
44. Worse, there is broad consensus that the complexity has not helped performance-
the model produces unreliable results with respect to certain areas, particularly rural service
territories. See, e.g., Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., CC Docket 96-45, Rural Task
Force Recommendation to the Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., at 18 (rel. Sept. 29,
2000) ("[W]hen viewed on an individual rural wire center or individual Rural Carrier basis,
the costs generated by the Synthesis Model are likely to vary widely from reasonable
estimates of forward-looking costs.").
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situation that may arise, particularly where Congress envisioned a system
based on private negotiations, backed by mediation and arbitration before
the state public utility commissions.45
2. Stringent Enforcement Is a Critical Component of a
Deregulatory Approach to Governance
An important corollary of my preference for a regime with fewer,
clearer rules is my belief that the FCC needs to place greater emphasis on
enforcement of the basic rights afforded by the statute. We cannot rely on
competition to allocate resources and maximize consumer welfare if
particular entities are able to gain advantage by violating our rules with
impunity. Penalties for such violations must be swiftly administered and
must be sufficiently severe to deter anticompetitive conduct. Failure to
engage in stringent enforcement breeds disrespect for the FCC's authority
and undermines the agency's credibility. Years of inaction in the face of
repeated complaints regarding unsolicited faxes-in violation of section
227-provides a perfect example: until the Commission's recent
enforcement proceedings, such faxes could be sent without any fear of
penalty.
Effective enforcement mechanisms also have the advantage of being
narrowly tailored. As I have explained, relying on prescriptive rules to
foster competition has the disadvantage of prohibiting conduct that may
benefit consumers. In other words, fixed rules are by their nature
overbroad. By relying more on enforcement mechanisms, the FCC can
tailor its intervention to particular circumstances, thereby allowing markets
to operate with minimal regulatory distortion.
A tension exists between crafting more streamlined rules and beefing
up our reliance on enforcement mechanisms: the same absence of
granularity that makes a rule streamlined creates gray areas that make
enforcement of unarticulated expectations unfair. I believe we can resolve
this tension in large part by crafting our rules with enforcement in mind.
Adopting such a mindset has two key components. First, if the FCC
determines that fulfilling congressional mandates requires us to promulgate
relatively complex and detailed rules, the agency should be prepared to
commit the necessary resources to enforce every component of those rules.
Second, if the FCC decides to adopt broad rules setting forth only general
parameters, we must be prepared to accept a broad range of conduct that
satisfies the general intent of such rules. We cannot insist on detailed and
specific forms of compliance based on a generally worded rule.
45. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(a) (Supp. V 1999).
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The first component of enforcement-oriented rulemaking-
committing to enforce every aspect of our rules-might seem inconsistent
with my overarching goal of having fewer, more streamlined rules; but in
fact it should reinforce that goal. As an initial matter, most statutory
provisions can be implemented with a small number of concise rules,
particularly if we bear in mind that a regulatory agency should not
micromanage the conduct of the entities it regulates. If the FCC adopts a
skeptical view of prescriptive regulation and nevertheless perceives a need
to adopt relatively complex rules, that perception presumably will reflect a
judgment that the proposed regulations will be necessary to achieve
congressional priorities. In such a scenario, a commitment to stringent
enforcement should act as a check on any bureaucratic preference for
complexity for its own sake. That is, recognizing that additional detail will
lead to a vast increase in enforcement proceedings should provide an
additional reason to question whether such detail is truly necessary.
For example, in license-transfer proceedings involving foreign
entities, the FCC has adopted the practice of conditioning its approval of
the transfer on the licensee's compliance with remarkably detailed side
agreements between the parties and the Department of Justice (among other
ag Urity46agencies) concerning law enforcement and national security. The problem
with such conditions is that, in actuality, the FCC has no input whatsoever
into such side agreements and has neither the resources nor the expertise to
give proper enforcement attention to these agreements-yet they are
conditions on an FCC license. Moreover, by conditioning the license in this
way, the FCC also is required to evaluate and approve each and every
modification of the agreement between law enforcement and the licensee-
another time-consuming task outside our core competency. I believe that
our inability to enforce detailed agreements concerning national security
and law enforcement should preclude us in the first instance from
mandating compliance with such agreements as a condition of approving
license transfers. Indeed, if committing to full enforcement were seen as a
precondition to adopting rules, I am confident that we would be extremely
reluctant to adopt them.
46. See generally Applications of Voicestream Wireless Corp. and Deutsche Telekom
AG, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 9779, 23 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1089
(2001); Applications of SatCom Sys., Inc., Order and Authorization, 14 F.C.C.R. 20798,
20847, 18 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1164 (1999) (separate statement of Commissioner
Furchgott-Roth); AT&T Corp., British Telecomms., PLC, VLT Co. LLC, Violet License
Co. LLC, and TNV [Bahamas] Ltd. Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14
F.C.C.R. 19140, 19222, 18 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 420 (1999) (separate statement of
Commissioner Furchgott-Roth).
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The second component of an enforcement-based approach to rule-
making entails recognizing that broad rules require the Commission to
permit a broad range of conduct. In other words, where the FCC makes the
judgment that an open-ended rule is appropriate, it must be prepared to
tolerate practices that comply with the rule, even if those practices conflict
with the Commission's own expectations. Broad rules should not be treated
as empty vessels to be filled in by subsequent commissioner policy
preferences-or worse, ever-changing preferences based on staff turnover.
For example, the Commission's rules require that AM, FM, and television
broadcast stations maintain a "main studio. ,47 Leaving aside the question of
whether there is a sound reason to have such a rule, the rule itself is quite
broad: it certainly does not set forth any specific requirements as to when
and by whom such main studio shall be staffed. In its order addressing
petitions for reconsideration and clarification of the rule, the Commission
set forth in greater detail that, to fulfill the rule, a station must "maintain a
meaningful management and staff presence., 48 The rule itself, however,
was not changed. Not until the release of a later decision (finding a station
not in compliance with the main studio rule) did the Commission clarify
that, at a minimum, a main studio must maintain full-time managerial and
full-time staff personnel.49 In a footnote, the Commission further explained
that management and staff must be present on a full-time basis "during
normal business hours" to be considered "meaningful. ' 50 Once again, all of
this elaboration did not modify the original rule.
Despite the fact that most of the guidance the Commission had
provided was not set forth clearly in our rules, the Enforcement Bureau
fined Queen of Peace Radio, Inc. $7,000 for willful and repeated violations
of the main studio rule because the station's only full-time employee
worked between 6:00 A.M. and 3:00 P.M. each day, and thus was away from
the studio after 3:00 P.M.5 Although the Commission, to its credit, canceled
47. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1125 (2000).
48. Amendment of Sections 73.1125 and 73.1130 of the Comm'n's Rules,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3 F.C.C.R. 5024, para. 24, 65 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 119
(1988).
49. Application for Review of Jones Eastern of the Outer Banks, Inc., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 3615, para. 9, 69 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 618 (1991)
[hereinafter Application for Review of Jones Eastern]; Petition for Reconsideration and/or
Clarification of Jones Eastern of the Outer Banks, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7
F.C.C.R. 6800, 71 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 912 (1992).
50. Application for Review of Jones Eastern, at 3616 n.2.
51. Queen of Peace Radio, Inc., Forfeiture Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 1934, para. 1 (2000),
pet.for recon. denied, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 7538, para. 2, (2000),
app. for review granted, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 20909, para. 3(2000).
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this forfeiture on review, based on the station's good faith efforts to comply
with the rule, this case demonstrates the need for an enforcement policy
that matches the rule. A licensee should be able to consult the
Commission's rules, without also needing to review the orders
implementing and clarifying such rules and research all Commission
decisions with respect to such rules, to understand the extent of its
obligations; and, if the FCC adopts a general rule-like requiring a main
studio-that should signify that the Commission established only a general
policy and will not graft specific expectations onto the rule.
While this example illustrates the danger of enforcing general rules
based on specific-and unarticulated-expectations, most of the recent
history of the newly created Enforcement Bureau has been very positive.
The Bureau handles formal complaints, occasionally on a "rocket docket"
basis; offers a mediation program that has an increasingly high settlement
rate; and conducts confidential investigations. While formal complaint
proceedings still move too slowly, the Bureau has managed to diminish its
backlog substantially. By negotiating substantial consent decrees--
including a $3 million decree with Verizon concerning its New York
section 271 compliance 52-- and issuing relatively large forfeitures, 53 the
Bureau has taken important strides toward deterring anticompetitive
conduct. While I would like to see faster resolution of complaint
proceedings and increased penalties for instances of willful violations of
our rules, I am encouraged by the Bureau's direction and I value the
important role the Bureau plays in ensuring ongoing compliance by FCC
licensees.
D. Government Must Be Humble in the Face of Rapid Change
Government must find new ways to adapt to the pace and complexity
of those it seeks to regulate, particularly in the technology sector. The FCC
faces tremendous challenges as it attempts to manage the increasingly fast-
paced telecommunications industry. The challenges we face today-E911
deployment, broadband access, the demand for 3G spectrum, "open access"
to cable modem systems, and the nature of the DTV transition-all were
barely known three short years ago. The complexity and speed with which
these issues arise, and with which the FCC must respond, further inform
52. See generally Bell Atl.-New York Authorization Under Section 271 of the Comm.
Act, Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 5413, 19 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1254 (2000).
53. See FCC Press Release, FCC Proposes $1.12 Million Forfeiture Against Coleman
Enterprises dlb/a Local Long Distance, Inc., and $1 Million Forfeiture Against Vista Group
International, Inc., for Apparently Slamming Consumers, Report No. CC 99-37, (Aug. 19,
1999) available at http:llwww.fcc.govlBureaus/CommonCarrier/NewsReleasesl1999/
nrcc9O59.html.
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my approach to regulation. Thus, my fourth basic regulatory principle is
that government must be humble about what it "knows" and what it can
achieve.
Government humility should manifest itself in two areas: (1) a
reluctance to regulate new technologies and services that fall outside the
scope of our statutory mandates; and (2) where limited intervention is
required, an eagerness to reach out to a broad array of groups to maximize
the information available to decision makers. The FCC should be reluctant
to intervene in the marketplace where emerging technologies are concerned
because government is a very poor predictor of the direction of industry
and technology. For example, when the FCC licensed PCS, it envisioned
the wireless business as a highly segmented and localized operation
amenable to small business preferences and set- asides. As a result, the
FCC designed an auction to accommodate a small business model by
creating 493 small geographic segments, setting aside certain spectrum for
small businesses, and granting bidding credits and installment payments to
other small entities.54 Government guessed exactly wrong: wireless turned
out to be generally a national business with now six national megacarriers
vying for the consumer dollar. The "small business" set-aside program
combined with installment payments unfortunately has resulted in
bankruptcies and underutilized spectrum.5  Similarly, when the
Commission launched its LMDS service, it barred cable and telephone
companies from buying the spectrum in their home regions because it
envisioned that the spectrum would be used for telephone and cable
56competition. LMDS turned out to provide neither; in fact, the spectrum
has languished, plagued by a lack of technology and capital. To the extent
that LMDS has provided service at all, it has been in the broadband
arena-a market not even fully appreciated when the ownership restrictions
were imposed.
It is not that government is ill-intentioned; rather, it is extremely
difficult to predict the twists and turns of the marketplace. In light of this
fundamental difficulty, I believe government should humbly recognize its
limits and exercise restraint. Of course, the FCC is an expert agency and
should always strive to attract talented and knowledgeable staff. In this
regard, I applaud Chairman Powell's efforts to recruit top-flight engineers,
54. See Implementation of Section 3090) of the Comm. Act; Competitive Bidding,
Fifth Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 5532, para. 7, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 859 (1994).
55. See, e.g., Nextwave Personal Commun., Inc. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 130 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
56. See Order on Reconsideration, supra note 22, at paras. 170-75.
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economists, and technologists.57 But there is little doubt that, even with a
staff that is second-to-none, the FCC will not be able to predict how
technologies will evolve and how the marketplace will adapt.
Government's humility also must extend to the deliberative process
itself. Government simply cannot replicate the vast knowledge base of all
those it regulates. Government in general, and the FCC in particular, should
strive to create procedures that maximize the flow of information to and
from the regulator. These procedures include a commitment to the
transparent gathering and dissemination of information to all interested
parties. On the government side of the ledger, the FCC can aid the
information-gathering process through more open and transparent
proceedings. More tangibly, the Commission should only reluctantly
invoke its authority to make proceedings "restricted," or closed to ex parte
presentations. Correspondingly, the FCC should require that outside parties
file more comprehensive and meaningful notices of ex parte presentations,
rather than the cursory filings that we routinely permit today in apparent
violation of our rules.58 Transparency also would be aided by an Internet
docket-tracking system that would allow parties to learn the procedural
status of a given draft order (i.e., whether the item is being considered in
the division, the bureau front office, or by the commissioners). In the end,
quality decision making requires timely information, and the FCC must
ensure that it maximizes its ability to obtain that information at every turn.
E. The FCC Is a Service-Based Organization
The FCC is a service-based organization and it should act like it. The
American taxpayers-our bosses-should expect prompt and well-
reasoned decisions from the Commission. Similarly, the Commission
should manage its resources efficiently to maximize public benefits.
Government should structure its operations and mission to achieve these
goals.
The Commission too often has failed to deliver prompt decisions,
which results in public harm based purely on inaction. In many cases, as a
businessperson, I would have preferred an answer contrary to my
regulatory position rather than no decision at all. As an economic matter,
the uncertainty created by indecision is perhaps the most damaging and
57. See FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell, Keynote Address at SUPERCOMM 2001
(June 6,2001), at htttp:llwww.fcc.gov/SpeecheslPowell/2001/ spmkpl04.html.
58. 47 C.F.R. § 1.1206(b)(2) (2000) (requiring the memoranda to "contain a summary
of the substance of the ex parte presentation and not merely a listing of the subjects
discussed. More than a one or two sentence description of the views and arguments
presented is generally required.").
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frustrating outcome conceivable.
In the controversial WQED license transfer case, for example, the
station's transfer application languished in the Commission for nearly three
years. 9 Although the deal was ultimately approved, the delay, combined
with the regulatory uncertainty caused by issuing and then rescinding
"additional guidance" on what constituted the requisite noncommercial
educational programming on the station, resulted in the parties backing
away from the business deal. WQED was left at square one. Although not
as draconian in result, I released a separate statement to express my
disappointment that our review of the Fox/Chris-Craft license transfers
took ten months to complete: ° The delay and uncertainty harmed the
business plans of all parties concerned. Similar delays have accompanied
other license transfers. Unfortunately, the need for more prompt resolution
of outstanding issues has by no means been limited to license transfers. The
Wireless Bureau just completed its well-documented backlog reduction
61project. Similar efforts are underway in the Cable Services and
International Bureaus.
I will strongly support backlog reduction efforts and encourage the
Commission to develop a docket management tracking system that ensures
decisions do not "fall through the cracks." I will encourage the use of short
form orders to deal with pleadings that fall to raise new issues or are
frivolous. The Commission also would benefit from exploring systematic
ways to address petitions for reconsideration and applications for review
more promptly. For example, petitions for reconsideration or applications
for review that fail to raise any new issues or facts should be acted on
within forty-five days or less. Similarly, I would favor exploring time limits
or a system whereby petitions for reconsideration or applications for review
pending longer than some predetermined period of time-perhaps six or
nine months-are denied via a short form order. The irony of much of the
backlog is that the pending decisions are often completely insignificant
(i.e., a petitioner raises the same argument that has been rejected by the
Bureau twice and the Commission once) and justifiably were placed at the
bottom of the "to do" box. Unfortunately, however, our decisions on these
59. See generally Applications of WQED Pittsburgh and Cornerstone TV, Inc., Order
on Reconsideration, 15 F.C.C.R. 2534, 19 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 241 (2000).
60. See Transfer of Control of Broadcast Licenses Held by Subsidiaries of Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc. to Fox Television Stations, Inc., File No. BALCT-20000918ABB (Jul. 25,
2001), available at http:llwww.fcc.gov/Speeches/Abernathy/Statements/2001/stkqal02.
html (separate statement of Commissioner Abernathy).
61. See FCC Press Release, Wireless Bureau Chief Declares Bureau's Backlog




matters are often conditions precedent to judicial review. Over time,
reducing the backlog soaks up vast Commission resources as years-old
orders are reviewed and reanalyzed often long after meaningful relief is
even available. Some presumptive rules and more effective tracking will
greatly enhance our ability to be a more responsive agency.
The impact of delays in rule making can be equally debilitating.
Following up on commitments made at the World Radio Conference in
May 2000, the FCC initiated a study to consider the possibility of
relocating incumbent MMDS/LTFS licensees in the 2500-2690 band to
enable the introduction of advanced wireless services in those bands.62 The
months of uncertainty created by this proceeding essentially froze
investment in this band. Soon after taking office on May 31, 2001, I called
for the Commission to end the uncertainty and to assure these licensees that
they will not be subject to forced relocation.63 Similarly, a four-year delay
in issuing rules regarding the technical parameters for the Digital Audio
Radio Service's ("DARS") terrestrial repeater network wreaked havoc on
those licensees as well as those in the adjacent Wireless Communications
Service bands.64 The Commission has an obligation to consider tough
questions like MMDS/ITFS relocation and DARS repeater deployment, but
we also have a corresponding responsibility to resolve those issues
promptly.
In order to help deliver on the promise of prompt decisions, the
agency also must focus its energy on its core mission and competencies.
The FCC has a limited budget; every dollar spent on issues beyond our core
mandates is a dollar not spent on resolving complaints, upgrading our
electronic filing system, or implementing our mandate for biennial review.
In assessing which problems to tackle, the FCC first should funnel its
resources to those areas where the Commission occupies the field. For
example, no other entity is responsible for preventing harmful radio
interference to licensed radio services; the Commission therefore should
fully fund those efforts. In contrast, the FCC should be reluctant to interfere
in areas such as advertising regulation, where state and other federal
62. See Spectrum Study of the 2500-2690 MHz Band: The Potential for
Accommodating Third Generation Mobile Systems, Final Report of the FCC Office of
Eng'g and Tech., Mass Media Bureau, Wireless Telecomm. Bureau, and Int'l Bureau (Mar.
30, 2001), at http://www.fcc.gov/3G/3gfinalreport.pdf.
63. Commissioner Kathleen Q. Abernathy, Address to the Wireless Comm. Ass'n (June
25, 2001), at http://www.fcc.gov/SpeecheslAbernathy/200l/kqalOl.html.
64. See generally Establishment of Rules and Policies for the Digital Audio Radio
Satellite Serv. in the 2310-2360 MHz Frequency Band, Report and Order, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, and Further Notice of Proposed Rulenaking, 12 F.C.C.R. 5754, 6
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 978 (1997).
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government entities have the jurisdiction, expertise, and resources to
65
respond. Nor should the FCC exhaustively duplicate the analysis of
competitive issues undertaken by the Justice Department or Federal Trade
Commission in merger proceedings; the FCC instead should focus on
communications-specific issues within its core competency.
In attempting to provide the highest quality of service, the FCC also
should look to private-sector efforts that achieve public interest goals
without FCC funds. For example, for almost twenty years the United States
Telecommunications Training Institute ("USTTI") has been offering
significant training opportunities to telecommunications professionals in
the developing world. To date, USTTI has trained approximately 6,000
graduates from 162 countries around the globe. 6 As a Commissioner, I
hope to encourage the FCC to work cooperatively with nonprofits like
USTII to achieve common goals and to avoid duplicating their fine efforts.
The Commission should always explore the availability of private sector
solutions that will allow the agency to focus more specifically its resources
on its core mission.
Finally, the notion of a service-based FCC extends to the way I
believe my office should be run. I believe that my legal advisors and I
should take all meetings, return all calls within twenty-four hours, and
make ourselves available to Congress and the press. To facilitate access to
my staff, we have posted each legal advisor's direct dial number on our
Web site. My office will endeavor to vote items as promptly as possible
and to move the decision making process along. In order for me to be an
advocate for such an agency-wide approach, it is imperative that I conduct
my dealings with the public in a way that is consistent with these
principles.
III. CONCLUSION
Public service is a tremendous privilege. That privilege has
corresponding responsibilities. The President selected me and the Senate
confirmed me to execute those responsibilities consistent with my
principles. The Commission faces immense challenges and the rapid pace
of technological change only exacerbates their impact. As in all difficult
things, however, the Commission should strive to establish and maintain
65. See Harold Furchtgott-Roth & Bryan Tramont, Commission on the Verge of a
Jurisdictional Breakdown: The FCC and Its Quest to Regulate Advertising, 8 CoMMLAW
CONSPECTuS 219 (2000).
66. See Ambassador Michael R. Gardner, Chairman, USTII, Opening Remarks at the
CyberForum regarding the Role of the Regulator (Sept. 19, 2001), at
http://ustti.org/forum/discuss.php3.
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core, consistent guideposts along the policy path. For me, there are at least
five such guideposts: (1) the Commission derives its mission first and
foremost from the statute; (2) within the confines of the statute, the FCC
should defer to markets and opt for regulatory intervention only when truly
necessary; (3) we must promulgate clear and enforceable rules and ensure
that they are followed; (4) government must be humble about what it
"knows" and what it can achieve; and (5) the FCC should be a service-
based organization. In the years ahead, the policy issues will no doubt
evolve and the marketplace will be transformed. My hope is that these
principles will survive intact.
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